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NOTES
SUPPLEMENTAL LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION FOR
STUDENTS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH-
SPEAKING ABILITY: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE RIGHT AND THE REMEDY
In Lau v. Nichols,' decided in 1974, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that students with limited understanding of the English lan-
guage2 possessed a right under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act3 to re-
ceive supplemental language instruction.4 State and local educational
agencies implemented remedial programs in response to the Court's
mandate. Responsibility for review of instructional programs devel-
1. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
2. Congress has categorized children possessing a limited ability to speak and understand
English as:
(A) individuals who were not born in the United States or whose native language is a
language other than English, and
(B) individuals who come from environments where a language other than English is
dominant .... and, by reason thereof, have difficulty speaking and understanding the
English language.
The Bilingual Education Act of 1974, § 703(a)(l)(A)--(B), 20 U.S.C. § 880b-l(a)(1) (A)-(B)
(1976).
There are approximately 3.5 million school children with limited English-speaking ability
throughout the United States. Note, Sink or Swim?-Is Bilingual Education a Way Into the Main-
stream, 2 CHILD. LEGAL RTs J. 4, 5 (1981). In Texas, about 843,000 Mexican-American children
attended public schools in the 1981-82 school year. United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 416
(E.D. Tex. 1981), rey'd, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982). In New York City, more than 100,000
foreign children, representing between 30 and 40 different languages, attend the public schools.
See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 515, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 632 (1978).
3. The Lau Court based its decision on The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(d) (1976). The Act provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
4. The phrase "supplemental language instruction" will be used throughout this Note to
refer generally to any program implemented pursuant to the discretion of a local educational
agency to meet the needs of students with limited English-speaking ability. See infra note 5.
5. Experts have developed two basic types of programs. The first is commonly referred to as
the "English as a Second Language" program. Students in this program engage in regular class-
room study during a portion of the day and spend the remainder of the day in special English
classes. See United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 419 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rey'd, 680 F.2d 356
(5th Cir. 1982). The second type of program is frequently termed "bilingual" or "bilingual-bicul-
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oped by local educational authorities was vested in the lower federal
courts.
In response to Lau,6 Congress passed the Equal Educational Oppor-
tunities Act,7 which created a second statutory source for the right to
receive supplemental language instruction. Moreover, the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides a possible consti-
tutional basis for the right to receive supplemental language
instruction.'
Thus, reviewing courts recognize three potential bases for the right to
supplemental language instruction: Title VI, the Equal Educational
tural" education. Bilingual education consists minimally of three elements. First, the students are
taught in both English and their native language in all subject areas. Second, students are given
special instruction in the English language. Third, students are taught their native history and
culture. See T. ANDERSON & M. BOYER, 1 BILINGUAL SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES app. B
(1970). See also Bilingual Education Act of 1974, § 703(4), 20 U.S.C. § 880b-7 (1976).
Proponents of full-scale bilingual education argue that the problems a child of limited English-
speaking ability faces in an English dominated society are two-fold. As a practical matter, the
child has a meaningless academic experience, falling quickly and perhaps permanently behind his
peers in school. Bilingual education thus ensures that the child learns to perform academically in
American public schools. Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier.: The Right to Bilingual Educa-
tion, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 52, 54 (1974). In addition, the child loses important social exper-
iences by not being able to communicate with his peers, and often suffers a consequential loss of a
sense of dignity and self-worth. Thus, bilingual education is beneficial psychologically to the
foreign language speaking child. See T. ANDERSON & M. BOYER, supra, at 49; Comment, Bilin-
gual Education and Desegregation, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1564, 1581 (1979).
The Court's mandate in Lau v. Nichols left complete discretion to the local school boards to
establish supplemental English language programs. 414 U.S. at 564, 565. For examples of recent
plans developed by experts to meet judicial and congressional mandates, see Detroit Public Schools
Dep't of Bilingual Education, Detroit Public Schools Three Year Bilingual Education Plan 1979-
1982 (available in ERIC documents, ED 193354); Carsud, Education of Achievement Outcomes.,
Justin'r Experience 1980 (available in ERIC documents, ED 193006).
A number of states also developed bilingual education programs at the state level. See ALASKA
STAT. § 14.30.100 (1981); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-1098 (1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-24-101
(1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-17 (West 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 14C (Smith-
Hurd 1981; IND. CODE ANN. § 20-10.1-5.5-1 to -5.5-9 (Burns Supp. 1982); KAN, STAT. ANN. § 72-
9501 (1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71A, § 2 (Michie/Law Co-op 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 126.261 (West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-23-1 (1978); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204-2-a (McKin-
ney 1981); TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.451 (Vernon 1982).
6. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
7. No state shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his
or her race, color, sex, or national origin by...
(f) the failure of an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome lan-
guage barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional
programs.
The Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, § 204(0, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(0 (1976).
8. "No state shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Opportunities Act, and the fourteenth amendment. Each evinces a sep-
arate standard for the courts to apply in reviewing remedial programs.'
Consequently, inconsistencies have developed among federal courts re-
garding the types of supplemental language programs local authorities
must implement and the role of the judiciary in reviewing the
programs.' 0
This Note analyzes lower courts' treatment of the right to supple-
mental language instruction. Part I explores the historical development
of an individual's right to receive instruction in his native language.
Part II examines lower federal court review of specific instructional
programs. Part III analyzes the relationship between the legal basis of
the right to supplemental language instruction and the standards of re-
view employed by federal courts in examining instructional programs.
I. THE RIGHT TO SUPPLEMENTAL LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION
A. Lau v. Nichols
In Lau v. Nichols," non-English speaking students in San Francisco
brought a class action suit against the local school system,12 alleging
that it had not provided special instruction in English 3 to approxi-
mately sixty-one percent of the non-English speaking children of Chi-
nese ancestry in the district. 4 Although they sought no specific
remedy,' 5 the plaintiffs urged that the school system's failure to offer
supplemental language instruction violated both Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 16
The United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the San
Francisco school system's lack of attention to the special language
problems of the Chinese students violated Title VI.' 7 In reaching its
holding, the Court relied not only on the specific language of the Civil
Rights Act,'" but also on the guidelines enacted by the former Depart-
9. See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 58.
11. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
12. Id at 564.
13. Id
14. Id
15. Id at 566.
16. Id The Court specifically refrained from reaching the constitutional issue. Id
17. Id at 564-65.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). See supra note 3.
Number 21 417
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ment of Health, Education, and Welfare to enforce the Act. 9
While Title VI itself provides only a general proscription of discrimi-
natory conduct in any local program receiving federal financial assist-
ance,2" HEW regulations applicable at the time of Lau directly
addressed the problem of supplemental language instruction. 21 The
particular clarifying guideline that the Lau Court relied on mandated
affirmative action by a school district when a child's "inability to speak
and understand the English language" excluded him from "effective
participation in the educational program."22
The Court in Lau applied an effect test under Title VI to the school
system. The Court reasoned that a child's inability to understand what
transpires in class effectively deprives him of a meaningful education.23
19. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1), 80.3(b)(3) (1980). See infra note 21.
20. See supra note 3.
21. The Court relied on a clarifying guideline and two regulations promulgated by the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare (now Department of Health and Human Services)
for the definition and standard of discrimination under Title VI. The regulations were promul-
gated under the authority granted by section 602 of the Civil Rights Act, which provides in rele-
vant part: "Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend financial
assistance to any program or activity. . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions
... of this title. . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders. ... The Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§ 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976). The HEW regulations relied upon by the Court provide that
those receiving Federal aid may not "restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any
advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service, financial aid, or benefit under the
program." 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1) (1980). See 414 U.S. at 567. The regulations provide further
that "a recipient, in determining the types of services. . . which will be provided. . . may not
... utilize criteria or methods of administration which. . . have the effect of defeating or sub-
stantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(2)
(1980). See 414 U.S. at 567, 568.
22. The HEW clarifying guideline that the Court relied on states in relevant part:
Where inability to speak and understand the English language excludes. . . children
from effective participation in the educational program offered by a school district, the
district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency... Any.. .sys-
tem employed by the school system to deal with the special language skill needs...
must be designed to meet such. . . needs as soon as possible and must not operate as an
educational deadend or permanent track.
35 Fed. Reg., 11, 595 (1970).
In his concurrence, Justice Stewart expressed concern over the Court's heavy reliance on the
relevant HEW guidelines in finding a violation of Title VI. 414 U.S. at 570. Justice Stewart
emphasized the necessity of applying a test of reasonableness to the regulations to determine if
they exceeded the language and intent of Title VI. He concluded that the regulations were reason-
able. d at 571.
23. 414 U.S. at 566. The Court observed that "[b]asic English skills are at the very core of
what these public schools teach. Imposition of a requirement that, before a child can effectively
participate in the educational program, he must already have acquired those basic skills is to make
a mockery of public education." Id
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss2/3
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The Court reasoned that this deprivation met the Title VI discrimina-
tion standard as explained by the HEW clarifying guidelines. 24 Find-
ing a Title VI violation, the Court ordered the San Francisco School
District to provide a remedy. 5 The Court, however, left the fashioning
and implementation of such relief to local authorities.26
Lau left open several questions that continue to plague lower federal
courts reviewing local instructional programs. First, the Lau Court
failed to enunciate a standard by which reviewing courts may judge
whether a local program is acceptable under Title VI.27 Second, the
Court did not prescribe a threshhold number of non-English speaking
students necessary to precipitate a school district's statutory obligation
to develop an instructional program." Finally, the majority failed to
reach the constitutional question, leaving ambiguous the precise scope
of the duty of local educational agencies to remedy the language
problem.29
B. Congressional Response to the Supreme Court Mandate
The Supreme Court's mandate in Lau30 for educational agencies to
provide supplemental English instruction elicited immediate congres-
24. Id at 568. The Court specifically noted that the test under Title VI, as promulgated in
the regulations, was an effect test. Consequently, there was no need to prove discriminatory intent
to establish a Title VI violation. Id Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have cast doubt on the
continued validity of the effect test. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
25. 414 U.S. at 569.
26. The Court clearly intended to leave the remedy to local educational agencies. Id at 564-
65.
27. The Court addressed only the situation in which the school district had not adopted any
type of supplemental instructional program. Id at 566. Thus, the Court failed to enunciate any
standard by which future courts could review individual programs.
28. Id at 572. Most statutes passed subsequent to Lau have established twenty as the requi-
site number of students who must be affected before a statutory obligation arises. See, e.g., MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 71A, § 2 (Michie/Law Co-op 1982); Tax. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.453(c)
(Vernon 1982).
29. See supra note 16. Although the majority did not reach the constitutional question, Jus-
tice Blackmun, in his concurrence, impliedly rejected the existence of a constitutional right by
seeking to limit application of Title VI to school districts having a substantial number of non-
English speaking students. 414 U.S. at 572. If a substantial number of children must be affected
before a duty arises under Title VI to provide bilingual education, then there can be no constitu-
tional basis for the right. Constitutional rights are personal; the infringement of a right does not
depend upon the number of persons affected. McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 235
U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914). See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 562 (1979); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 22 (1947); Missouri ex re/ Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).
30. 414 U.S 563 (1974).
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sional response. In 1974, Congress adopted the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act (EEOA) as an amendment to the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965.32 EEOA has become the central
31. The Supreme Court decided Lau on January 21, 1974. Id H.R. 69 and H.J. REs. 1104,
the Education Amendments of 1974, were reported out of the House Committee on Education and
Labor on February 21, 1974.
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1703-1706 (1976). In addition to passing EEOA, Congress amended the
Bilingual Education Act to provide financial incentives to local school boards to implement full-
scale bilingual educational programs. Id at 880b-7(l) to (4). Subsections (1)-(4) of section
880b-7 provide funds for the maintenance of bilingual educational programs, community activi-
ties to promote bilingual education, teacher training, and technical assistance to develop pro-
grams. Id In the statute's statement of policies, Congress made clear that it wholeheartedly
encouraged local boards to develop such programs. Id § 880b(a) (1976). The statute sets forth
the following policies:
The Congress declares it to be the policy of the United States, in order to establish equal
educational opportunity for all children (A) to encourage the establishment and opera-
tion, where appropriate, of educational programs using bilingual educational practices,
techniques, and methods, and (B) for that purpose, to provide financial assistance to
local educational agencies ... in order to enable such local educational agencies to
develop and carry out such programs. . . which are designed to meet the educational
needs of such children. .. ."
id The Bilingual Education Act also enumerates possible elements of a bilingual educational
program. Id at § 880b-14 (A) to (E). This enumeration includes provisions for instruction in
English, course instruction in the native language, voluntary enrollment for English-speaking chil-
dren who wish to participate, integrated classroom instruction in art, music, and physical educa-
tion, and maintenance of graded classrooms to the extent possible. Id Both the Act and its
legislative history indicate that Congress designed the amendments only to affirm the positive
aspects of bilingual education.
The Bilingual Education Act contains no language which would make its provisions mandatory
upon the states. See 20 U.S.C. § 880b-l to -6 (1976). In addition, congressional debate on the bill
indicates that the provisions are not mandatory. See S. REP. No. 1026, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 140
(1974) (Congress recognizes the importance of bilingual education); H. REP. No. 1211, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 149 (1974) (same); 120 CONG. Rc. 6280 (remarks by Rep. Perkins) (Congress extends
Act and amends it to broaden the class of schools eligible for funding); 120 CONG. REC. 6301
(1974) (remarks of Rep. Biaggi) (Congress recognizes "obligation of society to help these children
integrate into the mainstream of American education"); 120 CONG. REC. 6319, 6320 (1974) (re-
marks by Rep. Bingham) (Nation has responsibility to provide bilingual help).
The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Committee for the Education Amendments
illustrates Congress' view of bilingual education. In that report, the Committee stated:
The Senate Amendment,.. . substitutes a new text for the existing text of such Act. The
statement of policy of the Senate Amendment recognizes the importance of bilingual
educational methods and techniques .... [Tihe House bill contains no comparable
provision. The House recedes, with an amendment clarifying that it is children of lim-
ited English-speaking ability who benefit through the fullest utilization of multiple lan-
guage and cultural resources.
S. REP. No. 1026, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 147, 148 (1974).
Thus, courts and commentators frequently criticize the Bilingual Education Act as being merely
a policy statement rather than a substantive congressional mandate to local school systems. See,
eg., Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1008-09 (5th Cir. 1981). In Castaneda, the court specifi-
cally stated that "although the [Bilingual Education] Act empowered the U.S. Office of Education
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss2/3
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focus in bilingual education litigation.3 3 Section 204(f) 34 creates a pri-
vate right of action against local educational agencies for failure to take
"appropriate action to overcome language barriers" faced by students
within a particular school district .3  Because the Act does not define
"appropriate action, '3 6 reviewing federal courts seek to give content to
the standard by attempting to ascertain the legislative intent.37
The legislative history of EEOA, however, offers no substantive gui-
dance regarding the meaning of "appropriate action. ' 38  Representa-
tive Esch of Michigan had introduced the bill on the floor of the House
in response to concerns voiced by a group of Michigan Congressmen
about busing across district lines to achieve court-ordered desegrega-
to develop model programs, Congress expressly directed that the state and local agencies receiving
funds under the Act were not required to adopt one of these model programs but were free to
develop their own." Id at 1009. See generally Leibowitz, English Literacy: Legal Sanction for
Discrimination, 45 NOTRE DAE LAW. 7, 15 (1969).
33. Most recent cases have relied on EEOA to review bilingual educational programs. See
infra notes 58-95 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 7.
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1706 (1976). The statute provides: "An individual denied an equal educa-
tional opportunity, as defined by this subchapter may institute a civil action in an appropriate
district court ... against such parties, and for such relief, as may be appropriate."
36. When suit is brought under the statute by an individual claiming denial of an equal
educational opportunity, the court must examine the school district's action in light of the statute
to determine its "appropriateness." See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981);
Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982).
37. Courts continually struggle to define what Congress would consider "appropriate action."
See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009 (5th Cir. 1981) (Congress purposely left language
ambiguous to leave considerable discretion to the local agencies); Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe
Elem. School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405
(E.D. Tex. 1981) (Congress intended to impose bilingual education per se), rev'd, 680 F.2d 356
(5th Cir. 1982). The task of defining and applying a standard of review on the basis of the phrase
"appropriate action" was particularly troublesome to the Fifth Circuit in Castaneda. The court
stated:
Congress has provided us with almost no guidance, in the form of text or legislative
history to assist us in determining whether a school district's language remediation ef-
forts are "appropriate." Thus we find ourselves confronted with a type of task which
federal courts are ill-equipped to perform and which we are often criticized for under-
taking-prescribing substantive standards and policies for institutions whose governance
is properly reserved to other levels and branches of our government. . . which are better
able to assimilate and assess the knowledge of professionals in the field.
648 F.2d at 1009.
38. Because the Act was an amendment to the Education Act and was proposed on the floor
of the House, the only legislative history available on the particular provision would come from
House debates and from the Conference Report on the entire Education Bill. The debates on the
amendment, however, provide no guidance. See 120 CONG. REc. 8264-8281 (1974); S. REP. No.
1026, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 1-185 (1974).
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tion in the Detroit schools.3 9 The bill sought to contain busing within
district lines.' ° The bulk of the debate on the House floor, therefore,
dealt with the controversial interdistrict busing issue,4' rather than with
the merits of section 204(f) or the precise meaning of "appropriate ac-
tion".42 In effect, the provision passed unnoticed.
II. LOWER COURT INTERPRETATION OF SUPREME COURT AND
CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE
A. The Legal Basis of the Right
Since the Supreme Court decision in Lau v. Nichols,43 lower federal
courts have consistently upheld the right of individuals with limited
English-speaking ability to receive supplemental language instruction
in public schools. The lower courts' interpretations of the legal basis of
39. 120 CONG. REc. 6877 (1974). Representatives Esch, Ford (Wm.), O'Hara, and Huber, all
of Michigan, cosponsored the amendment. Id
40. It is clear from the remarks of the sponsor on the floor of the House that the central
concern of the Representatives was interdistrict busing, an important political issue in Detroit,
Michigan in 1974. Representive Esch stated: "The purpose of the amendment is to clearly indi-
cate that the intent of the House of Representatives is to disapprove cross-district busing such as
that which has created a great deal of unrest and uncertainty in the Greater Detroit area." 120
CONG. REc. 8264 (1974).
41. The bulk of EEOA deals with limitations on cross-district busing. The congressional
declaration of policy and the congressional findings are particularly enlightening. The official
congressional policy is: "The neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school
assignments." The Bilingual Education Act of 1974, § 201(a)(2), 20 U.S.C. § 170(a)(2) (1976).
The congressional findings elaborate further.
(a) the Congress finds that-
(3) the implementation of desegregation plans that require extensive student transpor-
tation has, in many cases, required local educational agencies to expend large amounts
of funds, thereby depleting their financial resources...;
(4) transportation of students which creates serious risks to their health and safety, dis-
rupts the educational process carried out with respect to such students, and impinges
significantly on their educational opportunity is excessive.
Id § 202(a)(3)-(4), 20 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(3)-(4) (1976).
42. Representative O'Hara, a cosponsor of the bill, made sole mention of the bilingual educa-
tion provision in a statement defending the bill during the floor debate. Opponents of the Amend-
ment and its busing provisions tried to employ parliamentary procedure to remove it from
consideration by arguing that the Amendment was not germane to the other sections of the Educa-
tion Bill. In response, Representative O'Hara remarked:
[I]t [the statute] deals with educationally deprived children, with libraries, with learning
results from educational innovation, with support and assistance to federally impacted
school districts, with adult education... education for the handicapped, bilingual educa-
tion, the study of Rate funding, ... that is, methods by which equal educational op-
portunities may be obtained.
120 CONG. Rac. 8270 (1974) (emphasis added).
43. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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the right, however, vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.'
To date, no court has held the right to be constitutionally based. In-
stead, courts have consistently relied on the relevant federal statutes.
An examination of the constitutional question, nevertheless, is critical
to an adequate analysis of the judiciary's role in protecting a non-Eng-
lish speaking child's right to receive supplementary language
instruction.45
Initially, courts followed Lau's lead and relied exclusively on Title
VI as the basis of the right.46 In response to the passage of EEOA,
however, courts began to shift their focus from Title VI to the substan-
tive standard articulated in the Act.47 Moreover, these courts attacked
the continued applicability of Title VI to supplemental language
instruction.48
Post-Lau Supreme Court decisions have adopted a stricter standard
for proving discrimination under Title VI than that imposed in Lau.
Rather than requiring only a showing of discriminatory effect, as in
Lau , 49 the Court presently requires an additional showing of discrimi-
natory intent.5" Although the Court has refrained from directly over-
44. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981) (right based on EEOA);
Idaho Migrant Council v. Board of Educ., 647 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognition of statutory
basis of right without specifying whether the basis is Title VI or EEOA); Guadalupe Org. v.
Tempe Elem. School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978) (the right falls specifically under EEOA);
Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974) (the right is based on Title VI);
United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (legal basis possibly constitutional with
heavy reliance on EEOA), rey'd, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982); Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (legal basis of right is EEOA in conjunction with HEW regulations).
45. See infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
46. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Rios v. Read, 480 F.
Supp. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Cintron v. Brentwood Free Union School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648
F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir.
1978).
48. The Fifth Circuit in Castaneda v. ickard attacked the viability of the Title VI rationale.
The court stated: "We must confess serious doubts ... about the continuing vitality of the ration-
ale of the Supreme Court's opinion in Lau v. Nichols. ... 648 F.2d at 1007. See Comment,
Biligual Education and Desegregation, 127 U. PA. L. Rae. 1564, 1578 n.82 (1979).
49. 414 U.S. at 568. Lau found discriminatory effect in the lack of a supplemental language
instructional program. Id
50. The Court first applied a test of discriminatory intent as opposed to effect as a basis for a
constitutional violation in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Subsequently, in University
of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 286, 328 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting)
Number 2]
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ruling Lau,"' the development of the stringent intent test effectively
undermines the applicability of Title VI in a majority of bilingual edu-
cation cases. Proof of discriminatory intent requires evidence that the
lack of a supplemental language instruction program resulted from the
discriminatory motive of local educational authorities.52 In most areas
of the country, however, the lack of bilingual education results from
the historic notion of America as a "melting pot," rather than from a
discriminatory motive. 3 Thus, in many cases, discriminatory intent is
difficult, if not impossible, to prove.5 4
Notwithstanding the questionable continued vitality of Title VI in
the area of bilingual education, EEOA provides ample support for the
proposition that state educational agencies possess a duty to provide
supplemental language instruction to non-English speaking children.5
This continued duty is grounded not only in the Act's affirmative direc-
tive for local educational agencies to take "appropriate action" to over-
come language barriers, but also in the Act's provision for a private
right of action against educational agencies for their failure to comply
with this directive. 6
B. Judicial Review of Instructional Programs
Because lower federal courts draw from three possible sources in re-
viewing supplemental language instruction programs,57 they necessar-
ily differ in their treatment of the programs when faced with a legal
challenge. Recent decisions exemplify the current confusion that in-
(1978), the Court read Title VI as coextensive with the equal protection clause, thereby adopting
the discriminatory intent standard for Title VI.
51. In Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), six justices embraced the intent standard as the proper
standard of discrimination under Title VI. The Bakke Court, however, refused squarely to over-
rule Lau, 438 U.S. 265, 286, 328 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
52. Cf. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
53. The availability of monolingual language instruction conducted in English is a historical
fact of life in American public schools. One commentator suggests that this is a consequence of
the general "wish to create a unitary Americanism both political and social." Roos, Bilingual
Educatiora This Hispanic Response to Unequal Educational Opportunity, 42 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 111, 113 (1978).
54. To prove discriminatory intent, a court must inquire into the subjective intent of the
responsible governmental body or official. For criticism of this type of inquiry, see G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 710 (10th ed. 1980).
55. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.




heres in judicial review of instructional programs.58
In Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dis-
trict,59 the Ninth Circuit adopted a limited role in overseeing the im-
plementation of bilingual educational programs. The Guadalupe court,
applying EEOA to reach its holding in favor of the school district,
deemed it inappropriate to review and to rule on the adequacy of pro-
grams already implemented by local school boards.60 The court em-
phasized the importance of leaving specific decisions concerning the
type of remedial language instruction to be adopted to local educa-
tional agencies, especially when the agencies could employ the exper-
tise of specialists to design programs best suited to the peculiar needs of
the students.6 '
In Guadalupe, Mexican-American and Yaqui Indian children
brought suit against the Tempe Arizona School District 62 alleging that
the "English as a Second Language" program adopted by the school
district to overcome language barriers was ineffective. 63 The plaintiffs
urged primarily that the school district's program of language instruc-
tion did not meet the statutory or constitutional standards.' 4 The
plaintiffs argued that only full scale bilingual education could fulfill the
statutory and constitutional mandates. 65  Moreover, the plaintiffs
claimed that the school district maintained an inadequate teaching staff
for the language program.66 Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the
school district's failure to institute a program of bicultural education
that focused on the historical contribution of the minority children's
58. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981) (intermediate standard of
review adopted); Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978)
(discretionary standard of review adopted); United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex.
198 1) (interventionist standard of review adopted), rev'd, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982).
59. 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978).
60. Id at 1030. The court, however, did not close its doors to future suits challenging the
effectiveness of an instructional program. The court noted that "[I]n this case plans were made
and implemented and the effectiveness of these is not challenged." Id
61. Extensive judicial involvement in substantive educational policy decisions may create
judicial management problems. See infra notes 106 & 107 and accompanying text.
62. Id at 1024.
63. Id The "English as a Second Language" program places children in the regular class-
room for a portion of the day and in an intensive English class with a bilingual instructor for the
remainder of the day. See supra note 5.
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ancestors violated the statutory and constitutional requirements.
67
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the three possible legal
bases for imposing a duty upon the school district to provide bilingual
education. The court concluded first that the Constitution did not im-
pose such a duty.68 Second, the court determined that Title VI had not
been violated, because the policies implemented did not totally fore-
close the students from obtaining meaningful education. 69 Finally, the
court concluded that the local educational agency's implementation of
remedial English instruction met the requirements of EEOA. 0
In reaching its holding, the Guadalupe court reasoned that neither
the Supreme Court's imposition of the duty to provide remedial lan-
guage instruction in Lau,7 nor the subsequent congressional mandate
in EEOA,72 imposed upon the school district an absolute substantive
mandate to provide full-scale bilingual-bicultural education pro-
grams.73 By instituting a remedial language instruction program,
therefore, the local school board had met its statutory obligation to
overcome language barriers through "appropriate action."74
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit in Guadalupe,75 the Fifth Circuit has
assumed a more active role in safeguarding the rights of students hav-
67. Id The plaintiffs alleged that the mandate of providing appropriate education necessarily
included bicultural education. 1d
68. Id at 1026-27. The Ninth Circuit adopted the lower tier equal protection analysis em-
ployed by the Supreme Court in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See infra note 104. The court agreed with the Rodriguez holding that the right to education is not
fundamental. 587 F.2d at 1026. The Guadalupe court applied lower scrutiny equal protection
analysis to the program, and concluded that "the decision of the [school system] to offer the educa-
tion program attacked. . . bears a rational relationship to legitimate state interests." Id at 1027.
The court, however, did not explain the reasons for its holding.
69. 587 F.2d at 1029. The court stated that "[p]roviding the appellants [children] with reme-
dial instruction in English which appellants appear to admit complies with Lau's mandate makes
available the meaningful education and equality of educational opportunity that Section 601 re-
quires." Id
70. Id at 1030. The court interpreted EEOA narrowly. Id
71. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
72. See The Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, § 204(0, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(1)
(1976).
73. 587 F.2d at 1030.
74. Id at 1024. Because the court granted summary judgment for the defendant school dis-
trict, it never reviewed the allegations of the petitioners. Three of the allegations arguably went to
the substantive educational policies employed by the school district. The fourth allegation, how-
ever, that the teaching staff was inadequate, arguably went to the effectiveness of the program.
The Ninth Circuit's unwillingness to review this allegation illustrates the great degree of deference
it granted the local educational agency.
75. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
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ing limited ability to understand English.76 In Castaneda v. Pickard,"
the Fifth Circuit articulated a workable approach to federal court re-
view of instructional programs based on EEOA.78
In Castaneda, Mexican-American children instituted a class action
suit against the Raymondville, Texas school district.79 The students
alleged that certain policies and practices of the school district,8" in-
cluding its failure to provide an effective bilingual educational pro-
gram, resulted in unconstitutional discrimination against the
children."1 In addition, they alleged violations of Title VI and
EEOA. 2 The Castaneda court established a framework for review of
the school district's action, which provided for a determination of the
soundness of the educational policy upon which the program was
based, 3 the reasonableness of the program as instituted,84 and the
school district's good faith effort in effectuating the program."
Applying this framework, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the plaintiffs'
specific allegations. First, the court considered the allegation that the
Raymondville program 86 concentrated too heavily on the development
of proficiency in English, allowing students to fall behind in other areas
of study.87 The court found that the program did not violate EEOA in
this respect," reasoning that the statute contemplated a program that
concentrated on development of proficiency in English, rather than afull bilingual-bicultural curriculum.89 In addition, the court refused to
76. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1007 (5th Cir. 1981).
77. Id
78. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
79. 648 F.2d at 992.
80. Id The policies complained of included an ability grouping program, which petitioners
claimed resulted in classroom segregation of whites and Mexican-Americans. Id Furthermore,
the petitioners claimed that the school district had discriminated against Mexican-Americans in its
hiring practices. Id
81. 648 F.2d at 992.
82. Id
83. id at 1009.
84. Id at 1010.
85. Id
86. Id The court did not explore the specific details of the Raymondville program, which
was an "English as a Second Language" program. See supra note 5.
87. Id at 1011.
88. Id In refusing to overturn the local district's specific policy decision to adopt an "English
as a Second Language" program rather than a bilingual educational program, the Fifth Circuit
was consistent with the Ninth Circuit decision in Guadalupe See supra notes 59-74 and accompa-
nying text.
89. 648 F.2d at 1011.
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examine alternative programs for their relative effectiveness, leaving
the task of program choice to the local school districts.90
The Castaneda court next examined the plaintiffs' allegation that the
school district had inadequately prepared teachers for participation in
the program.91 The court, reviewing both lay and expert testimony,
determined that the instructors' training program did not constitute a
good faith effort to effectuate the language program.9
Finally, the court considered the plaintiffs' allegation that the district
achievement tests, composed in standardized English, inadequately
measured the progress of non-English speaking students.93 While the
court summarily deemed the testing inadequate, 94 it did not base its
review of the testing procedures specifically on any of the three criteria
enumerated in its framework for review. Instead, the court substituted
its judgment regarding the adequacy of this substantive portion of the
instructional program for that of the local school board.95
Thus, in applying EEOA, the Castaneda court assumed a degree of
authority over local school district implementation of bilingual educa-
tion programs while simultaneously leaving control over basic policy
decisions within the local school boards.96 Although the Ninth Circuit
90. Id The Fifth Circuit's concern with its role in reviewing substantive programs adopted
by the local educational agency was appropriate. The court reluctantly reviewed the program,
adding the following caveat:
We have attempted to devise a mode of analysis which will permit ourselves and the
lower courts to fulfill the responsibility Congress has assigned to us without unduly sub-
stituting our educational values and theories for the educational and political decisions
reserved to state or local school authorities or the expert knowledge of education.
Id at 1009.
91. Id at 1012. The Fifth Circuit's review of the adequacy of the teaching staffis in complete
contrast with the deference shown by the Ninth Circuit in Guadalupe to the school district in its
employment of teachers. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
92. 648 F.2d at 1012.
93. Id at 1013.
94. Id
95. Id The Castaneda court asserted that, based on common sense, the testing was inade-
quate because it measured a student's academic progress in English and not in a foreign language.
Id If the goal of the system is to mainstream limited-English speaking children into English
society, however, measuring a child's progress in the English language by administering a test in
English is not improper. 648 F.2d at 1013.
96. See supra notes 75-95 and accompanying text. In a subsequent decision, the Fifth Circuit
reaffirmed its initial approach to review of supplemental language instructional programs. United
States v. Texas, 680 F.2d 356, 371 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'g, 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981). In
United States v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court decision that had ordered full
scale bilingual-bicultural education for kindergarten through twelfth grade throughout the state of
Texas. Id at 372. See United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405, 418-19 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rey'd,
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in Guadalupe9 7 also applied EEOA, it deferred substantially to the local
school district's power regarding both implementation procedures and
policy decisions.98
III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION
Two principle problems exist that confuse the role of the federal ju-
diciary in overseeing the implementation of supplemental language in-
structional programs. First, the uncertain status of the source of the
legal right to receive remedial language instruction renders the extent
of the right equally uncertain.9 9 Second, the absence of a Supreme
Court interpretation of the phrase "appropriate action" used in EEOA
leaves the lower federal courts free to interfere improperly with state
and local educational policy decisions, or alternatively to defer too
greatly to those decisions.100
A. The Interrelation of the Constitutional Right and the Remedy
The direct relationship between the legal basis of a right to supple-
mental language instruction and the type of relief a local educational
agency must provide warrants serious consideration. If the right to re-
ceive remedial language instruction rests on the fourteenth amend-
ment, the local school board as well as the reviewing court must
perform certain duties pursuant to the Constitution. Because a consti-
tutional right is personal, judicial determination that the right is
founded in the fourteenth amendment would require a school district
to provide supplemental language instruction regardless of the number
of children involved.0  Currently, a majority of states require a school
district to provide special language only if there are at least twenty in-
680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982). In disagreeing with the district court's imposition of bilingual educa-
tion, the Fifth Circuit stated:
At stake here are the educational policies of an entire state, matters traditionally, in our
federal system, viewed as primarily state concerns. The issue is essentially a pedagogic
one: how best to teach comprehension of a language. Neither we nor the trial court
possess special competence in such matters. It follows that in such thin ice both tribunals
should tread warily, doing no more than correcting clear inequities and leaving positive
programming to those more expert in educational matters than are we.
680 F.2d at 370.
97. 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978).
98. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 59-98 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 29.
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terested children.102
Moreover, the method by which courts recognize the constitutional
right creates specific problems. Courts can afford the right to remedial
language instruction constitutional status in either of two ways. First,
the judiciary could find the right to bilingual education implicit in a
fundamental right to education. 0 3 The Supreme Court, however, has
consistently refused to recognize education as a fundamental right." a
Alternatively, courts could find that non-English speaking persons con-
stitute a suspect class.'
If the courts were to hold that bilingual education is a per se funda-
mental right, school districts across the nation would be required to
102. See supra note 28.
103. The establishment of a fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny of the classification. See,
e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968) (access to the ballot); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to
vote); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (access to courts for criminal defendants).
104. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
In Plyler, the Supreme Court held that requiring undocumented alien children to pay tuition for
a public school education violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 102
S. Ct. at 2400. In holding the deprivation of education for undocumented alien children unconsti-
tutional, the Plyler Court maintained its position that education is not a fundamental right. Id at
2398. The Court, however, undertook an extensive discussion of the importance of education and
the stigma of illiteracy resulting from a total denial of a public education. Id The Court stated:
"By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure
of our civil institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the
smallest way to the progress of our Nation." Id Thus, in Plyler, though the Court refused to find
a fundamental right to education, the Court effectively increased its scrutiny under the rational
basis theory by emphasizing the extreme importance of education. Id
The total denial argument posited by the Court in Ply/er is also applicable to supplemental
language instruction. In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), the Court held that denial of supple-
mental language instruction deprived the students of any meaningful education. Id at 566. See
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
Whether the Court will accept such an extension of Plyler, however, remains unclear. In exam-
ining the constitutionality of the statute that denied education to the undocumented alien chil-
dren, the Plyler Court failed to articulate a standard of review to be applied in future cases. 102 S.
Ct. at 2398. See also G. GUNTHER, supra note 54, at 909 (notes that Burger Court has refused to
expand fundamental rights strand of equal protection beyond areas recognized by Warren Court).
105. In Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the Court held that Mexican-Americans
constituted a racially identifiable class for equal protection analysis in a particular Texas county.
Id at 479. The Court reserved the question of whether Mexican-Americans constituted a separate
class nationwide.
In Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982), the Supreme Court refused to recognize illegal alien
children as a suspect class. Id at 2397-98. See also Comment, Project Report: De Jure Segrega-
tion of Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 307, 348 (1972).
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implement full scale bilingual education programs. 10 6 Local educa-
tional agencies would consequently lose their discretionary power to
adopt experimental programs or to confront particular student needs
without first obtaining court approval. In addition, although all stu-
dents would be assured full scale bilingual education, the fiscal burden
on state and local governments might be devastating.0 7
Similarly, judicial elevation of non-English speaking persons to a
suspect class would prove problematic. Not only would federal courts
bear the responsibility of determining whether school districts have in-
tentionally discriminated against non-English speaking students, but
they would also have to develop a remedy to counteract the discrimina-
106. If a fundamental right or suspect class were established, then strict scrutiny requires that
the classification be narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest. See G. GUNTHER,
supra note 54, at 671. In bilingual education, however, there is no classification. In a school
district affording no supplemental English instructional program, both limited-English speaking
children and nonlimited-English speaking children are treated equally. See Grubb, Breaking the
Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 71 (1974).
Thus, discriminatory intent or purpose must be shown. See Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The district court in United States v. Texas, 506
F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rey'd, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982), found an equal protection
violation based on proof of discriminatory intent. The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the district
court opinion without reaching the constitutional question. 680 F.2d at 361.
If the right is based in the constitution, the court has a duty to protect it by imposing relief
tailored to the constitutional violation. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971) (scope of remedy is determined by nature and extent of constitutional violation);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (relief of segregation to be developed by lower
courts). In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066
(1976), the Tenth Circuit refused to order bilingual education as a remedy to eliminate the conse-
quences of de jure segregation. For a succinct analysis of the constitutional argument, see Note,
The Constitutional Right of Bilingual Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity, 47 S. CAL. L.
REv. 943 (1973-74). See also Kutner, Keyes v. School Dist. No. L" .4 ConstitutionalRight o Equal
Educational Opportunity?, 8 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (1979).
107. The expense of bilingual education is often overlooked. In Cintron v. Brentwood Union
Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), the district court refused to accept the local
school board's explanation for having an inadequate bilingual teaching staff. The school district
had been forced to lay off teachers in the face of declining enrollment. Recognizing the need to
retain the bilingual staff, the school district dismissed teachers having greater seniority than most
of the bilingual teachers by creating a separate tenure system for bilingual teachers. A New York
state court immediately struck down the separate tenure system. Morris v. Brentwood Union Free
School Dist., 52 A.D.2d 584, 383 N.Y.S. 2d 542 (1976). See supra Roos, note 53, at 132-33. To
comply with the Morris ruling, the school district revamped its tenure system and in view of
budgetary constraints dismissed nontenured faculty members, many of whom were bilingual
teachers. The Brentwood court subsequently struck this action down, completely ignoring the
fiscal constraints on the local school system. 455 F. Supp. 57, 58.
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tion.1°8 Thus, federal courts would find themselves in substantially the
same position as they presently are with respect to desegregation. A
flood of litigation would result, and courts would be forced to usurp the
roles of local educational agencies despite their inferior expertise., 9
Furthermore, a holding of intentional discrimination would foreclose
segregation of non-English speaking students districtwide for purposes
of economy. Instead, under the mandate of the desegregation cases,110
school boards would have to disperse non-English speaking students
throughout the district, and would have to institute bilingual educa-
tional programs as well as special instructors at each school within the
district. 1 '
The cost to the taxpayers for such elaborate programs would be dev-
astating. 2 In addition, locating enough properly educated bilingual
instructors to maintain the program would prove impossible.'t 3 The
overall result would be inadequate, low quality education for all
students.
108. See supra note 106 & 107.
109. For criticism of the judiciary's usurpation of the legislative role in the desegregation area,
see, for example, Yudof, Implementation Theories and Desegregation Realities, 32 ALA. L. REv.
441 (1981).
110. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Brown desegregation man-
date may conflict with the separation of limited-English speaking children for educational pur-
poses. See Comment, supra note 48, at 1565. Segregation of students for purposes of bilingual
education may in itself constitute a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id at 1593.
Brown's incompatibility with the concept of bilingual education assumes particular significance
in light of the recent decision of Martin Luther King Jr. Elem. School Children v. Ann Arbor
School Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979). In the King case, the district court held
that the school district had a duty to provide black students in the district an education in "black
English". Id at 1383. Effectuation of the district court mandate clearly requires segregation of
black and white children for instructional purposes. Id See generally 26 WAYNE L. Rav. 1091
(1980).
111. See Bradley v. Millikin, 620 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1980). In Bradley, the Legal Defense
Fund attempted by motion to intervene in the desegregation case on behalf of minority limited-
English speaking children. Under a court order of desegregation, Mexican-American children
would be dispersed throughout the school district. In the Detroit school district, bilingual educa-
tional programs were limited to certain schools in the district. The attempted intervenors alleged
that dispersing Mexican-American children throughout the district would ruin the existing pro-
grams and the quality of education for the students. The district court denied the motion to
intervene. See also Baez, Desegregation and Hispanic Students: .4 Community Perspective (1980)
(available in ERIC documents, ED 191646) (discussion of Milwaukee's Hispanic community's
attempt through the political process to exempt itself from court-ordered desegregation in order to
protect bilingual programs).




B. The Statutory Basis and the Remedy
In the absence of a Supreme Court decision finding a constitutional
right to remedial language instruction, lower federal courts must con-
front the difficult task of providing substance to EEOA.
A fair reading of the statute indicates that Congress intended to leave
substantial discretion for the development of appropriate relief to the
local educational agencies. While section 240(f) of the Act directs local
educational agencies to "overcome language barriers,"' " 4 the Act does
not require the implementation of any particular instructional pro-
gram. In the absence of congressional mandate, the judiciary cannot
impose its will on local educational agencies." 5
The Ninth Circuit in Guadalupe"I6 implicitly adopted a narrow read-
ing of the statute." 7 By leaving absolute discretion regarding imple-
mentation of instructional programs to local educators, the Ninth
Circuit left no room for judicial protection of the individuals' rights
under EEOA. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Castaneda"8 offered a
workable approach to the review of instructional programs." 9 The
Fifth Circuit's three-pronged test, which analyzes the soundness of the
educational policy, the reasonableness of the program adopted, and the
good faith effort of the school district, 120 has two major advantages.
First, by inquiring only into the soundness of the policy adopted and
the reasonableness of the program, reviewing courts leave considerable
discretion to local educational agencies to deal with both their students'
114, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1976).
115. The view that Congress intended to leave discretion in developing supplemental language
instructional programs to the local educational agencies is supported by the Supreme Court's re-
cent interpretation of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975
(Disabled Act), §§ 101-207, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Disabled Act].
The Disabled Act provides in relevant part: "(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a
right to appropriate treatment, services, and rehabilitation for such disabilities." Id § 6001 (1976)
(emphasis added). In Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), the Court inter-
preted the Disabled Act as leaving discretion to the states to develop alternative appropriate treat-
ment programs for mentally retarded citizens. Id at 18. See 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUToRY CoNsTRucrION § 6102, at 159 (3d ed. 1943) (Interpretation of analogous statutory
language is an often used method of statutory interpretation).
116. 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978).
117. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
118. 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981).
119. See supra notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
120. 648 F.2d at 1009-10. See supra notes 83-85.
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needs and their own fiscal constraints. 12 1 Second, by requiring local
educators to make a good faith effort, reviewing courts retain the abil-
ity to safeguard an individual's statutory rights. 22 The good faith test
avoids the result reached by the Ninth Circuit in Guadalupe of leaving
unfettered discretion to state and local educational agencies.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legal basis of the right to receive supplemental English language
instruction in public schools remains uncertain. Until the Supreme
Court rules on this issue, lower courts reviewing instructional programs
should adopt the test articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Castaneda v.
Pickard."3 The Fifth Circuit test retains a balance between protection
of the statutory right under EEOA and discretion of local educational
agencies in the development of remedial language instructional
programs.
Kathi Lynne Chestnut
121. The advantages of leaving bilingual educational policy choices to the local legislature has
been described by one commentator as follows:
Legislative action in the area of bilingual education is preferable to affirmative action
plans by the courts .... It is not only the greater perspicacity of the legislature for the
problems involved which favors action by that body, but also its wide range of resources
for developing bilingual education. It can plan on the basis of the needs for the entire
state, unlike the courts which merely respond to the factual setting presented.
Note, BilingualEducatio " Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 5 N.M.L. REv. 321, 333 (1975).
Traditionally, commentators criticize courts for engaging in judicial legislation. One commen-
tator recently suggested that "[1]egislation is a kind of lawmaking, but it is not the kind in which
courts should engage. Indeed,... when courts legislate they act beyond the scope of their proper
functions and capacities." Fernandez, Custom and the Common Law: Judicial Restraint and Law-
making by Courts, 11 Sw. U.L. REv. 1237, 1237 (1979).
122. For an argument that the standard of review should be more searching in bilingual edu-
cation cases, see Comment, The Legal Status ofBilingual Education in America's Public Schools.,
Testing Groundfor a Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation 0/Equal Protection, 17 DUQ. L.
Rav. 473, 505 (1979).
123. 648 F.2d 989, 1009-10 (5th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss2/3
